Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 99SC875 (Oct-ober 1, 2001): Plaintiff Nestor Horodyskyj worked as an apprentice electrician for Argus Electric Service in 1994 and 1995. Defendant Richard Karanian, the owner of Argus, was plaintiff's only co-employee. Plaintiff alleged that in the course of his employment he was sexually harassed by defendant, including suggestive remarks and unwelcome physical contact specifically targeted at him and personal in nature. Plaintiff claimed that he left employment as a result of the harassment.
Plaintiff brought numerous tort claims against Argus and defendant in district court, including assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and constructive discharge. The trial court held that the tort claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the claims against Argus, but reversed the dismissal of the tort claims against defendant individually.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. The supreme court recognized that if an employee's injuries result from an assault that is inherently connected to the employment or is attributable to neutral sources that are not personal to the victim or perpetrator, such injuries arise out of the employment for purposes of workers' compensation and the employee is barred from bringing a tort claim against the employer. However, employee tort claims are not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity if the assault originates in matters personal to one or both of the parties.
The supreme court determined that in the usual case acts of harassment such as those alleged by plaintiff are highly personal and fall into the category of inherently private assaults that do not arise out of employment. The court further recognized that the Act does not expressly address sexual harassment, and stated that such claims are appropriately brought under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which were designed to address workplace harassment. The supreme court concluded that workplace sexual harassment and related tort claims are neither compensable under the Act, nor barred by the Act's exclusivity provisions.

Michael E. Janssen, D.O. v. ICAO, 00CA2252 (September 27, 2001): Claimant applied for a hearing in her workers' compensation case. Employer scheduled the deposition of Dr. Janssen. Claimant asked Dr. Janssen to review the transcript of the treating physician's deposition prior to his own deposition. Dr. Janssen requested a pre-payment of $900 for the estimated 90 minutes it would take him to review the transcript. Claimant paid the $900 fee, but informed Dr. Janssen that she would ask the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to order a reduced rate of payment.
Claimant filed a motion to establish the payment amount to Dr. Janssen. Claimant asked the ALJ to apply Workers' Compensation Rule of Procedure XVIII(F), which limits physicians to charging $227.85 per hour for conferences and preparation of special reports. The ALJ agreed with claimant and ordered Dr. Janssen to remit the $558.22 overpayment to claimant. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) affirmed.
The court of appeals also affirmed. As a preliminary matter, the court held that Dr. Janssen's appeal was timely filed, despite being received 21 days after the date of ICAO's order, because he was entitled to 3 additional days under Colorado Appellate Rule 26(c) due to the fact that ICAO's order was served by mail. Nonetheless, the court concluded that Dr. Janssen was bound by the fee schedule in Rule XVIII. The fee schedule is not limited to treating physicians, and it applies to services, including litigation expenses, rendered in connection with injuries coming under the Workers' Compensation Act.