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Text Box: A PUBLICATION BY THE LAW FIRM OF
Clifton, Mueller & Bovarnick, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Text Box: CURRENT EVENTS, ARTICLES, AND SUMMARIES OF RECENT CASES AND LEGISLATION IN THE AREAS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, LIABILITY, INSURANCE, AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Text Box: 2009

Text Box: january

Text Box: SM
Text Box: Avalanche Decision Expands ALJ’s 
Discretion in Wage Determination

Text Box: Under C.R.S. § 8-42-102(3), an ALJ has considerable discretion in calculating a claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) when the ALJ determines that the default method of calculation found in section 8-42-102(2) would lead to an unfair result.  At issue in Avalanche Industries, Inc. v. Clark, decided by the Supreme Court on December 15, 2008, was an ALJ’s discretion to base an injured employee’s compensation benefits in a reopened claim, not on the worker’s wage at the time of injury, but rather on claimant’s wage at the time the claim is reopened.  In a lengthy opinion, from which three Justices dissented, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that for purposes of a permanent impairment award pursuant to the discretionary exception established in section 8-42-102(3), a worker’s AWW could be based on a salary that a claimant was earning at an employer subsequent to the original accident and the AWW should include the cost of continuing healthcare from the subsequent employer.  In 2000, while working as a secretary at Avalanche Industries, the claimant suffered a work-related accident.  As a result of the accident, the claimant was awarded twelve percent whole person impairment.  Avalanche admitted to a $415.63 AWW based on the claimant’s salary at the time.  The claim was subsequently closed.  While her claim was pending, the claimant left Avalanche for a new employer, Blair College.  Two years later, the claimant petitioned to reopen the claim alleging a worsened condition.  The Petition to Reopen was granted.  In 2005, the claimant alleged she was permanently totally disabled as a result of the 2000 injury.  At the time she stopped working for Blair College, the claimant’s average weekly wage was $625.  After a hearing on the issue of AWW, the ALJ held the claimant’s AWW should be based on her salary at Blair College, plus the cost of continuing her COBRA benefits from Blair of $178.76 per week, resulting in an AWW of $803.76.  The Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed the ALJ’s ruling.  In a divided ruling, the court of appeals also held the ALJ had properly calculated the claimant’s AWW based on her most recent salary and health insurance cost.  The Supreme Court agreed the discretionary exception of section 8-42-102(3) is broad enough to allow an ALJ to consider a claimant’s salary at a subsequent employer and extends to the calculation of the cost of the claimant continuing the subsequent employer’s health insurance benefits pursuant to COBRA.  To justify its holding, the Court opined the “date of injury,” for purposes of calculating the AWW is  the date of reopening.  This statement  alone may result in a slew of litigation.
Justices Rice and Coats, in separate opinions each joined by Justice Eid, dissented.  Justice Rice noted, “Nothing less than the stability of the workers’ compensation system is at risk in this case.”  Justice Coats said, "While our case law interpretations of the statutory scheme have long acknowledged great flexibility in the calculation of an injured employee’s average weekly wage, they have never suggested that an award of compensation payments from an employer could be based on any wage or salary other than the employee’s wage under his contract of employment with that employer. . . [U]ntil today the scheme had not been construed to permit an award altogether unrelated to the rate at which the injured employee was recompensed by the employer ordered to pay it."  Justice Coats observed, “Subjecting employers to liability for future wage contracts with different employers exposes them to damages for potential wage losses which they cannot foresee and over which they have no control” inappropriately introducing an element of civil damages, contrary to the principle on which workers’ compensation is based.”
Although the Supreme Court disagreed its decision would have these results, Respondents should expect an “avalanche of litigation” on AWW, including an increase in Petitions to Reopen, together with increased difficulty in settling claims on a full and final basis.  The court’s ruling introduces a significant level of uncertainty into the system.  An employer can predict an employee's injury may degenerate over time and result in reopening the award.  However, employers and insurers will have great difficulty in setting premiums if the calculation of the AWW is based on a wage figure that did not exist at the time of the injury.  The incentive to settle claims promptly will diminish, and employers and insurers will be unsure about their ultimate financial responsibility to employees.

Text Box: Closing files is the name of the game and it’s hard to do if the Claimant refuses to provide the information Respondents are entitled to receive pursuant to the applicable Rules.  Many claims get stuck in this rut – a request for information is sent to the Claimant, Claimant refuses to provide the requested information, and a Motion and Order to Compel the disclosures are  required.  If, after entry of an Order compelling disclosure, the information is still not provided, it can be used to Respondents’ advantage.  Page four of this month’s Defense Talk highlights the firm’s recent victory in  Wright v. College Pro Painters.  In Wright, the Claimant failed to abide by ALJ Martin Stuber’s Order compelling him to provide Rule 5-4 releases, historical medical and employment information, and responses to Respondents’ discovery.  After the Claimant violated the Order to Compel, a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Failure to Abide by Order was filed and subsequently granted.
The steps to getting a claim closed on a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Failing to Abide by an Order of an ALJ are detailed.  Initially, make sure to request the information the claimant is obligated to provide per Rules 5-4(C) or 9-1, W.C.R.P.  If the Claimant does not comply, document the non-compliance in writing.  If Claimant still refuses to provide the requested information, request counsel file a Motion to Compel.  Because the Rules entitle the Respondents to both essential background information and discovery (in claims involving represented claimants), these Motions are routinely granted.  Defense counsel will monitor receipt of the Order to Compel, together with the Claimant’s deadline to comply with the Order.  As soon as the claimant is in violation of the Order, a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Failing to Abide by Order can be filed.
Dismissing a claim with prejudice is a severe penalty.  ALJs hesitate to impose it.  However, if the efforts to obtain the information are carefully documented, if the Claimant violates the ALJ’s Order and if prejudice to the Respondents is clearly articulated to the ALJ via the Motion to Dismiss, it should be granted.
Please contact any of the attorneys in our office to discuss utilizing this tactic in your claims.

Text Box: Note: Summaries and articles should not be relied upon as authority for a particular case.  Consult your attorney for advice on the application of all the law to the specific facts of your case or legal problem.
Text Box:         File Closure
             Utilizing the Motion to Dismiss              with Prejudice
                 By Katherine M. Holom

Text Box: VICTORIES IN THE TRENCHES

 

Text Box: James R. Clifton
In Wanita Renea Young v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc. and American Home Assurance, the claimant filed a Petition to Reopen a claim involving a September 12, 2000 accident, alleged she suffered a new injury on June 12, 2006, and sought medical benefits.  Following hearing, Administrative Law Judge William Martinez denied the claimant’s Petition to Reopen, denied and dismissed the June 12, 2006 claim and denied the request for medical benefits as unauthorized.  The claimant appealed ALJ Martinez’ Order.  The Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed the Order of ALJ William Martinez holding the ALJ’s determination that the ATP’s  opinion that the claimant’s condition was unchanged is a reasonable inference supported by substantial evidence in the record.  ICAO also recognized an ALJ is not required to reopen a claim based upon a worsened condition whenever an ATP finds increased impairment following maximum medical improvement.
Richard A. Bovarnick
In the claim of Gail Barber v. ABM Industries and ESIS, Administrative Law Judge Nancy Connick agreed with Respondents, that the claimant’s permanent medical impairment was limited to six percent scheduled impairment for her carpal tunnel syndrome and lateral epicondylitis, per the Cumulative Trauma Disorder Matrix, consistent with Dr. Alison Fall’s testimony.  ALJ Connick rejected the 30 percent whole person impairment assigned by the authorized treating physician, Dr. Rick Artist.  Judge Connick further held that the Respondents were not required to file a Final Admission of Liability or request a Division IME when Dr. Artist revised his original impairment rating of zero percent to 30 percent whole person.
M. Frances McCracken
In the claim cited Michael Handson v. Northwest Pipeline and Pacific Employers’ Insurance Co., Administrative Law Judge Ted Krumreich granted Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, denied and dismissed the claimant’s Petition to Reopen his October 19, 2002 claim, and vacated the hearing set on multiple issues, including permanent total disability.  ALJ Krumreich agreed with Respondents the issues raised by the claimant’s Petition to Reopen, i.e., the relatedness of the claimant’s right hip avascular necrosis to the work injury, had been previously determined by Administrative Law Judge Bruce C. Friend following a November 2007 hearing.  Judge Friend determined the claimant’s right hip avascular necrosis was not caused by industrial injury.  Therefore, the doctrine of issue preclusion barred the claimant from relitigating causation and worsening.
Erica A. Weber
In Tebby McLaughlin-Cramer v. Capital Holdings and ACE American Insurance, Administrative Law Judge David Cain denied the claimant’s Petition to Reopen, holding subjective pain complaints were not dispositive of a worsened condition and claimant’s injury was subject to exacerbations over time.
The claim cited as Misty Farber v. Washington Inventory Services and ACE American Insurance, involved extensive issues.  After two days of hearing, Administrative Law Judge David Cain denied claimant’s request for penalties for Respondents’ alleged failure to pay medical bills, alleged failure to pre-authorize medical treatment, and alleged failure to have adequate insurance.  ALJ Cain also denied claimant’s request that her parents be reimbursed their expenses incurred during claimant’s hospitalization and the claimant’s request for post-MMI rehabilitation services.
In the claim of Randall Freitik v. Connections Academy, LLC and OneBeacon Insurance Co., the claimant, who was a seasonal worker, was injured in the course and scope of his employment in May 2008.  The claimant was paid by the employer through July 2008.  The claimant was not invited to return to work the following school season due to substandard job performance.  Administrative Law Judge Peter Cannici denied claimant’s request for temporary total disability benefits finding the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between his wage loss and his work injury.
In Kent Lockhart v. Tetra Tech, Inc. and ESIS, a January 2008 hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Edwin Felter, Jr. on the issue of compensability.  Following the January 2008 hearing, ALJ Felter found the claimant suffered a compensable, but temporary, aggravation of his pre-existing condition.  ALJ Felter further held the claimant was not entitled to medical benefits after April 2007 when his pre-existing condition returned to baseline.  Respondents filed a Final Admission of Liability consistent with the Judge’s ruling.  Claimant requested a Division IME, which was performed by Dr. Robert Mack.  Dr. Mack opined the claimant was not at MMI, rejecting ALJ Felter’s determination that the claimant had a pre-existing medical condition.  After a December 2008 hearing on Respondents’ Application, ALJ Felter held the Respondents had overcome the DIME’s opinion by clear and convincing evidence.  ALJ Felter found the claimant was precluded from relitigating the previously determined issue of causation.
Katherine M. Holom
In the claim of Angelo Ortiz v. Service Masters, Inc. and ACE American Insurance, Administrative Law Judge Bruce C. Friend agreed with Katherine Holom that Rich Bovarnick’s testimony was credible for purposes of pursuing an appeal.  Rich testified that, although the Office of Administrative Courts certified e-mailing ALJ Friends’ Specific Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to Respondents’ counsel on March 31, 2008, the Order was not received by him until May 23, 2008 after he contacted the OAC on May 22, 2008 and obtained an amended Certificate of Service.
In Rawlin Passman v. Labor Ready, Administrative Law Judge Donald E. Walsh denied and dismissed the claimant’s request for temporary total disability benefits from May 16, 2008 and ongoing.  ALJ Walsh found the claimant had been offered modified work within the authorized physician’s approved restrictions.  The claimant began working in the modified position offered to him.  However, on May 16, 2008, the claimant voluntarily abandoned his position with the employer and failed to return to the workplace.  Therefore, the claimant was responsible for the termination of his employment.
In the claim cited Walter Wright, Jr. v. College Pro Painters and ACE American Insurance, Administrative Law Judge Donald E. Walsh entered an order dismissing the claimant’s claim with prejudice based on the claimant’s failure to comply with an October 13, 2008 Order compelling him to produce executed Rule 5-4(C), W.C.R.P. releases and essential information and respond to Respondents’ Interrogatories and Requests for Production.  Under the Order compelling him to produce the releases, essential information and discovery responses, the claimant had until November 4, 2008 to comply with the Order.  The Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss was filed November 12, 2008 and granted December 2, 2008.

Text Box: DECISION PERMITS EX PARTE MEETINGS WTH PLAINTIFF’S PROVIDERS

Text Box: It has long been understood that plaintiffs waive the physician-patient privilege by bringing a claim and injecting their medical condition into a case.  Last year’s Colorado Supreme Court decision in Reutter v. Weber, 179 P.3d 977 (Colo. 2007) clarifies the Court’s prior decision in Samms v. District Court and permits ex parte meetings between defense counsel and plaintiff’s health care providers under specific circumstances.  In Samms, the court held that plaintiffs must be given notice and the opportunity to attend defense counsel’s interviews with medical providers where there was a reasonable probability that medical information unrelated to the claim (“residually privileged information”) would be divulged.  In the Reutter case, the Court clarified its holding in Samms.  The Court concluded that Samms does not impose a blanket rule requiring the plaintiff-patient be given the opportunity to attend interviews with medical providers under any and all circumstances.  Rather, Samms holds that the court must take appropriate measures to protect against disclosure of residually privileged information.  Where the risk that residually privileged information will be divulged during an interview is relatively high, the preferred method of protecting the confidential information is to provide the plaintiff with prior notice and an opportunity to attend the interview.  Where there is little likelihood that privileged information will be disclosed, the plaintiff must be given sufficient notice, by motion or otherwise, in order to have an opportunity to object to the ex parte interview to the court.  The court then has the discretion to permit the defendant to conduct the interview ex parte if the court concludes there is little risk for the disclosure of residually privileged information.

Text Box: DOWC MILEAGE 
REIMBURSEMENT CHART
Mileage is reimbursed at the rate that was in effect on the date the mileage was incurred:
Prior to 07/01/99 — 20 cents
Effective 07/01/99 — 28 cents, 32 cents if 4-wheel drive required
Effective 01/01/04 — 30 cents
Effective 01/01/07 — 37 cents
Effective 01/01/08 — 40 cents
Effective 01/01/09 — 46 cents

Avalanche Decision Expands ALJ’s Discretion in Wage Determination

Victories in the Trenches

Practice Pointer

Decision Permits Ex Parte Meetings With Plaintiff’s Providers

Changes to Rule 18-6(A)

Ipsi Dixit

Mileage Reimbursement Chart